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India’s rural populations remain routinely marginalized in national policy decisions. 
The economic concerns of farming communities are often ignored by policy makers, with a 
complete lack of attention paid to systemic failures and decades of ill-governance. Perhaps the 
biggest manifestation of this is the country’s farmer suicide epidemic, which has been ongoing 
since the 1990s, having taken more than 300,000 lives.  
The prolonged and pervasive nature of the crisis necessitates an analysis of both the 
structural constraints impacting Indian agriculture as well as civil society’s response. This is 
especially significant considering that India is often referred to as the “world’s largest 
democracy.” A close analysis of today’s farmer movements, however, suggest that they are 
periodically inactive and largely ineffective in impacting structural change. Why? 
A viable explanation for this lies in the application of social movement theoretical 
perspectives, which point to the value of culture and identity in shaping movements. It is argued 
that culture, in conjunction with capacity and socio-political capital, becomes an agency of 
reform when leveraged to induce a sense of “collective identity” amongst participants. The 
value of such a hypothesis is evidenced by Indian farming communities, whereby until the 
1990s, they existed as some of the most important non-parliamentary political forces across 
multiple states. 
By applying existing these theories to both historical and present-day movements 
within the Maharashtrian district of Wardha, the text proposes that today’s farmers stand 
divided, as conflicting characteristics (be it class, caste or religion) take precedence over a 
singular farmer identity, thereby hindering collective action and, in the process, placing limits 
on the politics of farmer empowerment. In doing so, it deepens understandings of how culture, 
collective identity and emotion cultivate political opportunities, facilitate socio-economic and 
political agency and ultimately lead to structural change within communities. 
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Despite India’s recent focus on industrialization, agriculture continues to be its largest 
sector of employment and an indispensable food source. Agriculture accounts for 17.32% of 
the country’s GDP (Indian Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation 2018) and 
more than 44% of Indians work either directly or indirectly in agriculture (World Bank 2017), 
making the field pivotal in the economic growth of the country. Simultaneously, India also 
faces an agrarian crisis of monumental proportions. Statistics from India’s National Crime 
Records Bureau indicate that close to 300,000 farmers have taken their lives in the past 20 
years by ingesting pesticide or hanging themselves, with this wave being officially recognized 
as the largest of recorded suicides in human history (Center for Human Rights and Global 
Justice 2012, 1). Approximately 41 farmers die every day, a statistic that incited the tagline 
many Indians are all too familiar with: every 30 minutes, a farmer kills himself.  
The reasons for this long-standing crisis are as complex as they are debatable, but it is 
known that extreme indebtedness is a common factor behind most of the reported suicides 
(Kaushal 2015, 49; Posani 2009, 10). Critical researchers have dug deeper into farmers’ 
economic concerns to analyze the causes of their current marginal standing (Posani 2009; 
Bastian 2012; Kaushal 2015). Their results point to the opening of the Indian economy in 1991 
and the economic reforms that ensued as the fundamental defining factors. A report released 
by an Expert Group under the Ministry of Finance on Agricultural Indebtedness points to a 
steep decline in agricultural growth over the past twenty years, resulting in the abolition of 
farmers’ subsidies, competition with foreign multinationals with superior monetary capital, 
infrastructure and technology, rising input prices and weakening support systems (Indian 
Ministry of Finance 2007). 
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Given its severity, understanding why this crisis has been tolerated by the Indian 
government and general public for so long is imperative. Social movement theory in 
combination with a critical analysis of similar movements go a long way in understanding this 
area. However, the limits of theoretical analysis lie in the fact that, while there is a wealth of 
literature about the economic and structural facets of the country’s suicide crisis, research 
relating specifically to present-day Indian farmer movements mobilizing to tackle the issue is 
scant or non-existent.  
This study attempts to address that gap. In doing so, it asks why modern-day farmer 
movements in India have not translated to meaningful structural change, despite the ongoing 
human rights crisis which has garnered international attention. Are they missing something? 
To add more insight to this line of thought, the following sections also examine whether or not 
a lack of collective identity and cohesion amongst farming communities have impacted the 
success of its movements, thereby contributing to the country’s agricultural decline and 





The Current State of Indian Agriculture: 
Assessing the Structural Constraints 
Prior to examining the dynamics of both historical and present-day farmer movements 
in India, it is worth considering the structural constraints that contribute to present-day farmer 
distress. The following sections lay out the primary factors that have either directly or indirectly 
contributed to the decline of agriculture in India. This includes but is not limited to: (i) 
increasing costs of production within the agricultural sector; (ii) an inadequacy of agricultural 
policies relating to debt relief and access to credit; and (i) the absence of adequate rural 
infrastructure. 
Considering the geographical scope of this study, these factors are discussed within the 
context of cotton farmers in the Indian state of Maharashtra. However, their relevance holds 
across multiple geographical locations and crop types across India.  
1. Cost of Production 
In order to protect agricultural producers from sharp falls in farm prices, the 
government of India announces a Minimum Support Price (MSP) for certain crops (one of 
which is cotton) at the beginning of every sowing season (Farmers’ Portal 2016). Essentially, 
this means that the price of a farmer’s produce is determined by the government. However, for 
the majority of the crops, the MSP announced by the government is often far lower than a 
farmer’s cost of production. This is particularly true for cotton, which is becoming an 
increasingly expensive crop to farm (Dev & Rao 2009, 602).  
The involvement of foreign multinationals further contributes to cotton farmers’ 
increasing costs of production. Historically, cotton farming has been relatively inexpensive for 
farmers – during harvest, cotton growers would cultivate crop seed and save them for the 
following season. However, in 2002, India’s Genetic Engineering Approval Committee 
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approved Monsanto International’s Bt cotton variety, a move which resulted in the far more 
expensive Bt cotton monopolizing India’s cotton industry. With Bt seeds, farmers cannot 
replant seeds harvested from the crop – hence, seeds need to be purchased year after year. 
(Center for Human Rights and Global Justice 2012, 6). While Bt cotton has been proved to 
provide better yield, around 50 percent of farmers’ expense goes toward the seed and according 
to one of Monsanto’s own studies, 95 percent of cotton farmers in India now have expenditures 
more than income (Center for Human Rights and Global Justice 2011, 34). The variety also 
necessitates the use of increased amounts of water and is hence ideal for irrigated land – an 
infrastructural feature largely absent in Indian agriculture.  
The impact of this infrastructural gap is then exacerbated by a lack of awareness of 
farmer training, a key consideration given that warnings about the increased water 
requirements of Bt cotton are reportedly provided on packages in English (and hence, are not 
understood by the majority of farmers). The misapplication of an expensive water-intensive 
seed in drought-hit regions coupled with the falling market price of cotton has resulted in (i) 
poor harvests, and (ii) farmers being riddled in debt with both banks and illegal money lenders 
and viewing death as the only feasible alternative (Center for Human Rights and Global Justice 
2012, 8).  
There also appears to be a direct conflict of interest in terms of the perpetuation of Bt 
cotton – the co-chair of the Genetic Engineering Approval Committee (India’s only regulating 
body of genetically modified agriculture) is also on the board of directors for the International 
Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications (ISAAA), an organization funded by 
Monsanto (Shiva 2015).  
2. Debt Relief and Access to Credit 
While India does have a debt-relief policy in place for farmers, its implementation 
appears to be misdirected and discriminatory in nature. Both debt-relief and monetary suicide-
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compensation packages exclude farmers with no land titles – a categorization that frequently 
encompasses women in farming, farmers from lower castes, those who have land on lease and 
those who have inherited their land (Indian Ministry of Finance 2008). Additionally, suicide 
compensation packages often exclude families wherein a farmer’s suicide is deemed by 
authorities as non-agriculture related (Open Government Data 2015).  
While loan waivers and debt relief policies have long been cited as viable solutions for 
more than ten years, many assert that they will not work unless implemented in conjunction 
with other welfare schemes. Even with the launch of India’s largest debt relief package in 2008, 
there were multiple concerns. For instance, several farmers who did qualify to receive the 
benefits were not included in the list of beneficiaries by lending institutions. Accountability 
measures were also questioned as lending institutions responsible for implementing the scheme 
were tasked with monitoring their own work. Alternations were eventually discovered within 
claim records but there was no follow up. Hence, many assert that these policies are merely a 
tactic to ‘sweep farmers issues under the rug’ (Anand & Karnik 2017; Singh 2017; The Logical 
Indian 2017). 
A related agricultural development problem is one which concerns the lack of access 
to credit in rural areas – commercial banks are not present in remote locations of India, and co-
operative banks which have been set up previously have largely failed due to a lack of funds 
(Golait 2007, 95-96). Recognizing this barrier, the government introduced the Kisan Credit 
Card (KCC) scheme (translating to “the farmer’s credit card”) as a viable solution to the 
problem. The scheme was introduced in 1998 and has since become a flagship program 
providing access to affordable, short term credit in the agriculture sector. It is currently the 
only [legitimate] credit option for farmers in regions with limited access to banks (Chanda 
2012, 3).  
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Considering the duration of the scheme’s existence and the push by the government at 
various levels, one would expect to see significant impact by now. However, according to a 
study conducted by the International Growth Center, there is no indication that the scheme has 
increased either agricultural labor productivity or land productivity (Chanda 2012, 14). The 
alternative for most farmers is then to turn to illegal money lenders for assistance – a move 
which often results in deeper levels of debt with more fatal consequences (Center for Human 
Rights and Global Justice 2011, 7).    
3. Inadequate rural infrastructure 
Irrigation and sustainable water management infrastructure 
In 2005, the Indian government launched the Bharat Nirman program (translating to 
“the construction of India”), an initiative intended to expand basic rural infrastructure. One of 
the key components of the Bharat Nirman program was to provide an additional 10 million 
hectares of irrigated land by the year 2012 (National Portal of India 2011). However, between 
the year 2005 and 2012, the total percentage of irrigated land only progressed from 32.87% 
(52.8 million hectares) to 36.33% (57.6 million hectares). The total arable land in India is 160 
million hectares (Food and Agriculture Organization 2012). 
At the end of 2015, less than 40% of India’s farmland was adequately irrigated and the 
majority of smallholders generally have no choice but to hope for timely rain in regions 
afflicted by relentless drought. Despite the Indian government revising their budget in February 
2016 to accommodate irrigation projects and “sustainable management of ground water 
resources” (Indian Ministry of Finance, 2016), active steps have not been taken to achieve the 
same. Data from the Irrigation Development Corporation of India for the state of Maharashtra 
– the epicenter of the crisis - reveals that as of April 2016, there are 515 irrigation projects 
underway, 85 of which have been underway for the past 30 years, 61 projects for 20 years, 78 
projects for 10 years and 179 projects for 5 years (Kapre 2016). 
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Access to healthcare services 
To effectively address India’s farmer suicides, one needs to understand the nuances of 
what comprises farmer distress. While debt might appear as the most obvious contributing 
factor, there are several other factors at play, one of which is the rural population’s access to 
adequate healthcare. As per World Bank (2016) statistics, the rural population of India is 
around 716 million people (67%) and yet there is a chronic lack of proper medical facilities for 
them. Considering the mental health needs of farming communities and the treatment gap, it is 
not difficult to point to the lack of such as one of the factors exacerbating the farmer suicide 
crisis in India. A report released by the Brookings Institution analyzed information provided 
by the country’s National Crime Records Bureau to further understand the decades-long 
tragedy of farmer suicides. They cited illness – both mental and physical - and not debt alone, 
as the underlying cause for the majority of farmer suicides (Ravi 2015, 6-8).  
Despite India’s economic growth, the country’s health care expenditures remain 
exceptionally low - between 2008 and 2014, India’s annual health care expenditure only 
increased from 1.1 percent to 1.4 percent (World Health Organization 2014). Rural Health 
Statistics (2014-15) released by the government also indicate that there is a shortfall of 6,796 
sub-centers, 1,267 Primary Health Centers (PHCs) and 309 Community Health Centers 
(CHCs) (Indian Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 2015). As per the same report, while 
the sub-centers, PHCs and CHCs in rural areas increased in number in 2014-15, the current 
numbers are not sufficient to meet their population norm. A report released by the ILO confirms 
this by stating that approximately 75% of the health infrastructure in India – including doctors 
and specialists and other health resources – is concentrated in urban areas where less than 35% 
of India’s population lives. The report also cited that 87.5 percent of the Indian population did 
not have legal health coverage in 2010, with 93.1 percent in rural areas alone (Scheil-Adlung 




In the following sections, I provide a framework for analyzing the present-day 
landscape of farmer movements in India. Specifically, I first examine the major schools of 
thought in social movement literature, presenting their key theoretical components and 
considerations. With this, I explore how culture and collective identity construction inevitably 
shapes political structures and opportunity (Section 3.1). Then, I review the successes of India’s 
iconic and immensely successful farmer movements of the 1980s (Section 3.2). Finally, I 
consider the parallels between India’s farmer movements from thirty years ago and the 
movements today (Section 3.3). 
3.1 Theoretical Framework: Structuralism vs. Cultural Constructivism 
Goodwin & Jasper (2004, 2-5) point to two broad schools of thought within the field of 
social movement analysis: the structuralist approach (the perennially dominant paradigm) and 
the cultural constructivist approach. Each has vastly different interpretations of the role of 
political opportunity, strategy, culture, emotions, agency and structure in analyzing the 
emergence and success of social movements. Structuralists emphasize the role of economic 
resources, political structures, formal organizations and social networks. Constructivists on the 
other hand, acknowledge the importance of all these factors, but maintain that the role of culture 
permeates and shapes all aspects and social contexts of collective actions, including their 
“structures.” Accordingly, constructivists emphasize collective identities, strategies, cultural 
traditions, capacity and emotions as key facets of successful mobilizations.  
Could these clashing approaches absorb each other’s insights without completely 
rethinking their foundations? In this section, I engage with precisely this question while pulling 
insights from social movements research. Accordingly, I present the literature on the various 
aspects emphasized across both structuralist and constructivist schools of thought. 
 12 
3.1.1 Significance of Culture, Emotion and Collective Identity 
Structuralists argue that the state is the “main player” that social movements interact 
with, the “structure” at the center of everything. They present a universal, invariant analytical 
framework, wherein emphasis is placed on political institutions, economies and material 
resources. While this perspective does not negate the value of culture, emotional responses or 
identity in shaping movements, it holds these elements must not be prioritized. Instead, 
structuralists understand cultural factors in terms of their relationship to the larger political 
system, i.e. the objective, non-cultural element (Goodwin & Jasper 2004, 5).  
Conversely, cultural constructivists maintain that cultural and strategic processes define 
and create the very systems that are usually presented as “structural” (Polletta 2004, 98). For 
instance, while constructivists acknowledge the significance of the state, they view it as a 
“complex web of agencies and authorities, thoroughly saturated with culture, emotions and 
strategic interactions” (Goodwin & Jasper 2004, viii). As asserted by Melucci (1995, 45), 
“there can be no cognition without feeling.” Consequently, they argue that culture becomes 
agency itself when leveraged to induce a sense of “collective identity” amongst participants.  
Gould (2004, 157) emphasizes the definitive role of emotion in culturally-rooted 
collective action by stating that people usually organize around highly emotionally charged 
issues, making the process of intentionally and strategically mobilizing emotion a vital part of 
the fabric of movements. Similarly, Nepstad (2004) illustrates the importance of evoking 
emotional responses through the employment of stories and interpersonal interaction. She 
states that, “activists can generate anger by revealing information that violates moral norms or 
by framing an event as a breach of ethical standards” (2004, viii). However, Ganz (2011, 275-
278) maintains that acute emotional sentiments – specifically anger, isolation and self-doubt – 
do not guarantee successful mobilization as they carry with them the potential to both “mobilize 
and inhibit collective action.” He also argues that patterns of helpless can be reconstructed as 
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collective will by movement leaders who engage in: (i) storytelling rooted in shared struggles; 
(ii) education and awareness raising; and (iii) loyalty and affective bonds via consistent 
interaction with community members. 
3.1.2 Capacity Building vs. Political Opportunity 
While strict structuralist models view collective action as constructed predominantly 
around the state, cultural constructivists recognize activists’ actions are often directed at 
multiple audiences apart from the state (Goodwin & Jasper 2004, 11). Structuralists' conception 
of the state as the center of social movements is derived in part from their notion of “political 
opportunity.” McAdam (2004, 203) and McCarthy & Zald (1977, 1216-1217) cite political 
opportunities as the deciding factors of social movements stating that opportunities make 
established political order more vulnerable or receptive to challenge. By claiming that “social 
movements arise only when expanding political opportunities are seized” (McCarthy & Zald 
1977, 1216), they fail to distinguish between political opportunity and people’s perceptions of 
those opportunities (Goodwin & Jasper 2004, 14).  
Conversely, while asserting the role of culture, Polletta (2004, 184) asserts there can be 
no fixed or universal “model” of social movements; while some require political opportunities, 
others might not. Hence, she warns against confusing structure with process (2004, p.99). 
Similarly, Ganz acknowledges the uncertainty of political opportunity, asserting that 
movements are more likely to achieve positive outcomes if they develop strategic capacity, 
stating it develops when leaders (i) possess local knowledge, (ii) employ tactics stemming from 
local knowledge, and (iii) possess motivation – a factor tied to leaders’ emotional investment. 
3.2 Farmworker Movements in India: A Historical Overview 
The “New Farmers’ Movements” 
Agricultural decline is by no means a recent phenomenon in India. Varshney’s (1998) 
analysis of India’s urban-rural struggles points to its bleak agricultural situation post its 
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Independence in 1947. In the forty years preceding Independence, there was a significant 
decline in per capita food grain output, meaning food availability grew only 12%, while the 
population increased 40%. Additionally, less than 15% of India’s farmland was adequately 
irrigated and the formidable and immediate task of transforming agriculture thus fell on the 
state’s first elected leaders (Posani 2009, 15). 
 According to Posani’s (2009, 17) analysis of the economic history of the subcontinental 
agrarian distress, between 1964 and 1967, India experienced a fundamental and far-reaching 
shift in its agricultural policy, igniting turbulent cultural and political effects that still 
reverberate today. In India’s Green Revolution, the government began to regulate price of 
outputs, while mandates on the use of resource intensive and expensive imported seeds and the 
advent of new technologies put overwhelming pressure on small farmers, even as price 
incentives were offered to motivate their compliance. 
In the late 1970s, India’s farmworkers began mobilizing in response to structural 
transformations in the agrarian economy. Faced with an increasingly commoditized 
agricultural economy and state regulation of markets, marginal farmers along with landless 
farmworkers protested against the government’s monetary value of their outputs, which 
Omvedt (1989, 8-9) argues did not match the price of input. Also, farmworkers held that terms 
of trade between industry and agriculture prevailingly sided “in favor of industry and against 
agriculture” (Lindberg 1994, 98). Organizations formed to demand lower prices on inputs, like 
seeds, fertilizer and pesticide, lower tariffs on electricity and water, lower taxes, and seeking 
debt relief. Likewise, they demanded higher prices for their products: grains, cash crops, 
vegetables, milk, etc. Posani (2009, 9) and Brass (1994, 3) maintain that until the early 1990s, 
Indian farmer movements — popularly named farmer agitations — were some of the most 
important non-parliamentary political forces across multiple states. Lindberg (1994, 96) further 
adds depth by asserting they impacted all of India’s political levels: local, regional and national.  
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State and national governments often faced massive political and economic 
demonstrations, often lasting for several days and involving hundreds of thousands of farmers. 
Roads and railways were often blocked. Villages were generally closed to government officials 
and politicians during these agitations. In some states, farmers caused steep price rises by 
withholding their produce from the market. Also, farmers were reported refusing to pay taxes, 
electricity or water bills, interest, or loans from banks (Lindberg 1994, 96).  
Lindberg (1994, 101) notes that although these were non-violent demonstrations, 
hundreds of farmers lost their lives due to law enforcement officials’ violent repression. 
Nonetheless, the movements’ impact was extraordinary. Lindberg cites strong evidence 
demonstrating they played a significant role in the overthrow of the Rajiv Gandhi government 
in the 1989 elections. Posani (2009, 18) also argues farmer’s political currency was 
strengthened with the increasing proportion of government agriculturists, specifically when a 
pro-rural party came to power in the late 1970s. 
In July 1990, when the new Congress government tried to increase fertilizer prices by 
40 per cent, massive opposition from all political parties emerged seeking drastic changes from 
the proposal. Similarly, countrywide protests facilitated by the farmer movements and 
opposition parties emerged when they decided to import wheat in 1991 to keep prices down 
(Lenneberg 1988, 451). Omvedt (1989) and Lindberg (1994, 97) assert that by the mid 1980s, 
these movements – commonly referred to as the ‘New Farmers’ Movements’ – were viewed 
by many as part of a new wave of movements, which also included environmental, women's 
and Dalit's movements. 
Deconstructing the Rise of Rural Power: Bharat vs. India 
The farmworker mobilizations of the 1980s did not comprise of one farmer movement 
but of multiple regional movements that differed in important respects (Lindberg 1994; 
Dhanagare 1990). Drastic economic reforms were the most obvious point of divergence 
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between the movements. They were supported in full by Shetkari Sanghatana (SS) in 
Maharashtra – owing to conditions of severe drought, poor soil and limited irrigation facilities 
in the state –  but opposed by Bharatiya Kisan Union (BKU) in Uttar Pradesh and the Karnataka 
Rajya Raitha Sangha (KRRS) — whose participants faced better ecological conditions. Gender 
was another divisive factor (Lindberg). Maharastra’s SS – led by Sharad Joshi, an economist 
and former UN official – adopted a progressive stance on women’s issues. They tackled equal 
rights of women to land and property, violence against women, and their demonstrations were 
often women-led.  Conversely, the BKU adhered to traditional patriarchal values.  Women 
were generally not part of the movement; and Mahendra Singh Tikait, their leader and a farmer 
himself, made women’s place clear when he said, “the women stand behind us” (Lindberg 
1994, 97-99).  
Despite the movements’ contrasting attitudes toward certain issues, Lindberg (1994), 
Brass (1994) and Dhanagare (1990) all maintain their greatest strength was their construction 
of a collective identity — they were all characterized by an anti-urban/anti-state/anti-capitalist 
ideological content. Yet numerous underlying complexities may lead us to question the very 
possibility of such a phenomenon.  
For centuries, the caste system has been the organizing principle of Indian society, 
weaving disparate strands into the very fabric of socio-economic, political and cultural life. 
Yet, Maharashtra’s movement – led by Joshi –  had a mixed class and caste composition. 
Lindberg claims finding any “dominant” caste in the movement was impossible and all 
members were viewed on equal par. Leadership drew from different groups, extending from 
the political left to the right, and comprised of urban intellectuals and local activists. There 
were no fixed rules of membership or organization or strict tiers between local, intermediate 
and top levels in the organization. Anybody who participated in agitations was a member 
(Lindberg 1994, 111).  
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Lindberg (1994, 112) explains that Joshi stressed the sentiment at multiple rallies – 
directing his message at “the evils of the rural social structure as against urban exploitation.” 
His sentiment was compounded by the central message of the movement: “Bharat versus 
India” – with India being the country’s westernized name while Bharat is its native name 
(Lindberg 1994, 96). Similarly, in the state of Uttar Pradesh, while Hindu fundamentalism and 
politics were on the rise, leaders and members stressed the non-communal character of the 
“peasant union” (Lindberg 1994, 114). According to Lindberg (1994, 114-115), leaders led 
their movements strongly emphasizing this point.  
One particular leader, Mahendra Singh Tikait, is credited for initiating the public 
meetings by greeting the participants with both a Hindu and a Muslim slogan. Likewise, 
movements in Punjab drew on support from the peasantry as a whole, regardless of differences 
in religion, caste, gender and class. The movements also viewed the mobilization of landless 
laborers (who worked for the farmers) as being equal to the farmers themselves, and 
organizations comprised of both on equal par (Lindberg 1994, 114-115). 
3.3 Today’s Movements: Comparable Contexts, Changing Responses 
 Invoking the overwhelming political influence of the rural lobby at the end of the 80s, 
Posani (2009, 2) refers to today’s farmers’ movements as being periodically inactive and 
ineffective. A close examination of farmworkers’ current structural constraints reveals many 
similarities with those workers faced thirty years ago: poor government regulation, inadequate 
irrigation, unaffordable inputs, inadequate access to credit and debt relief (Posani 2009, 20-
27). Yet, the results of the movements proved drastically different, as evidenced by today’s 
marginalization of agrarian interest in the national policy agenda. Why?  
Varshney (1998) suggests rectifying the economic constraints faced by farmers is 
largely a matter of political will, determined to a large extent by political pressures faced by 
the government. Such pressures demand collective action. However, Posani (2009) and 
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Damodaran (2011) note today’s farmers stand divided as conflicting class/caste/religious 
identities have taken precedence over a singular farmer identity, thereby hindering collective 
action and in the process placing limits on the politics of farmer empowerment. Gupta (2005, 
755) reinforces this hypothesis arguing changes in contemporary Indian rural society’s social 
and economic structures have drastically shifted the identities of the ‘villager’ and the ‘farmer’.  
The absence of a collective identity also influences the voting decisions of farmers, 
causing occupational considerations to be eclipsed by interests like caste, region, religion 
and/or language – often viewed in Indian traditions as principles worth dying for. Hence, 
political parties today no longer need to fight elections based on “sectional strategies such as 
the ‘urban-rural’ divide, or ‘farm prices and subsidies’” (Posani, 2009, 36). This is signified by 
the fact that despite rural India constituting more than 70% the country, governments so far 
have not changed their stance on prices and subsidies, nor have peasant-based parties come to 





4.1 Research Design  
Methodological Framework 
The methodological choices made were grounded in the assumption that I was studying 
features of human life which are highly contextualized and non-quantifiable, and hence subject 
to vast interpretation. The interpretations and conclusions presented by this study are hence 
drawn from four broad pillars of the human political experience: social structures, power and 
representation, culture and human agency. Interview questions were also framed along these 
lines. 
Within this context, Carspecken (1996, 10-22) asserts that any qualitative study is 
defined by the researcher’s pursuit of acquiring a thorough understanding of the following 
items: (i) social routines; (ii) the distribution of routines across related social sites; (iii) 
constraints and resources affecting social routines; (iv) cultural forms associated with social 
routines; (v) subjective experiences; and (vi) life history narratives (total or partial). I decided 
to pursue and make sense of these items in the following ways: 
1. Obtain a concentrated record of social routines within farmer movements through 
intensive observations of meetings, and through semi-structured qualitative interviews 
with leaders of non-profits (including farmer unions), journalists, politicians and 
scholars. 
2. Obtain a less concentrated record of routines within villages and the surrounding 
community through casual, first-person observations of farmers recorded 
journalistically.  
 20 
3. Look for evidence of cultural themes within both farming communities and farmer 
movements [more broadly] by producing a detailed reconstruction of movement culture 
and community life using field notes and transcripts of interviews.  
4. Look for evidence of broader social system determinants on both major and micro-
activities within movements using theoretical frameworks as established by social 
movement theoretical perspectives.  
Geographical Scope 
The research was conducted with a focus on the district of Wardha which lies in the 
Vidarbha region of Maharashtra. Vidarbha is a region in Eastern Maharashtra consisting of 11 
districts. In the past ten years, a significant number of the country’s farmer suicides have 
occurred within six of these districts (the predominantly cotton producing districts) (Sainath 
2011; Roy 2017), one of which is Wardha, which has seen consecutive droughts and a high 
number of farmer suicides every year. From January 2006 to October 2016, as many as 1,313 
farmers have reportedly committed suicide in the district. (Ravi 2017) Furthermore, Vidarbha 
is specifically brought up in multiple policy discussions and is the site of multiple welfare 
programs launched by the government. (Chaudhary 2016; Torgalkar 2017; Deshpande 2017). 
4.2 Research Participants  
Background of Research Participants 
Research participants come from a variety of professional backgrounds. While most are 
leaders of local or regional-level nonprofits, other participants include journalists (both local 
and national), politicians and academic scholars. The nonprofit organizations considered all 
fall under one of the following categories: research foundations, social advocacy organizations 
or community based organizations. 
This study’s findings and conclusions are based largely on the responses of 24 
individuals working within rural Maharashtra, 17 of whom are directly affiliated with either a 
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local farmer union or a regional-level farmer movement. The remaining seven individuals are 
journalists, academic scholars, part of a research foundation, or leaders of a local 
developmental nonprofit, one of whom was involved with a national farmer movement in the 
past. Participants are mixed in terms of the extent of their affiliation with movements – while 
11 of the 17 are actively involved in the decision-making processes, the involvement of the 
remaining six appear to be sporadic. Five individuals associate with multiple farmer unions.  
14 of the 24 participants are farmers themselves, but of these, only seven cited farming 
as their primary source of income. Additionally, many of the activists interviewed take on other 
roles in their day to day lives. For instance, multiple union leaders and activists also serve as 
politicians, local journalists or are involved with a local development NGO is some capacity. 
All participants work closely with rural communities or have done so in the past. The majority 
of participants are male. Participants come from a mixed class and caste composition.  
Recruitment of Research Participants 
Considering that the site of the study was a small, hard-to-reach district within rural 
India, the majority of participants were recruited by utilizing snowball sampling methods. 
While some leaders of nonprofits were recruited for interviews through direct communication, 
others were contacted through a referral. In regards to this study’s farmer participants, it should 
be noted that regardless of their background in agriculture, farmer participants were recruited 
for interviews based on their capacity as movement leaders and activists, not their role as 
farmers. 
Journalists and select scholars were also contacted through referrals while politicians 
were recruited via direct communication. Similarly, the non-profits chosen for this study were 
selected on the basis of either their presence online (which was generally limited given their 
isolated area of operation), or through a referral provided via email communication.  
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4.3 Data Collection  
The research is a non-interventional, non-randomized study, engageing primarily in 
qualitative, prospective data analysis. The prospective data collection comes from semi-
structured interviews with leaders of local and regional nonprofit organizations. This includes 
both individuals who are directly affiliated with farmer movements and mobilization efforts, 
as well as individuals who work around farmer issues that are not specific to organizing. This 
study’s findings are also based in semi-structured qualitative interviews with journalists, 
politicians (local and regional) and academic scholars. Each interview lasted between 40 – 120 
minutes. Interviews were held in either the participant’s place of work or in their home.   
In addition to qualitative interviews with research participants, data is also drawn from 
casual observations of leaders of nonprofit organizations (including farmer unions). 
Observations of their interactions with villages and farming communities were documented 
and have been analyzed for the purpose of this study. Observations from meetings organized 
by leaders of nonprofits (specifically, farmer unions and social advocacy organizations) were 
also documented.  
The purpose of the interviews and observations was for participants to share their 
knowledge and views of Wardha’s – and more broadly, Maharashtra’s – farmer movements, 
their goals and demands, composition, strategies and leadership, how their relationship with 
the movement has impacted their life and/or the farmer suicide crisis in the country. Select 
participants were also asked to share their views on the region’s historical farmer movements 
of the 1908s. 
4.4 Boundaries of the Study 
Regardless of the choices made in terms of the research design and methodology, this 
study had a number of limitations which should be acknowledged.  
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The primary limitation of this study pertains to the general shortfall of farmer 
participants who are smallholders and or whose primary source of income is drawn from 
agriculture. As previously noted, the majority of the study’s participants cited that their primary 
source of income does not come from farming. From a human rights perspective, this is 
problematic as it results in privileged groups speaking on behalf of those with limited social 
agency and political currency. From a research perspective, narratives of identity, emotion and 
collective action are best based in personal accounts of farmers themselves. However, it is 
difficult to frame a discussion around collective processes (or the lack thereof) with limited 
information about individual struggle.  
The decision to exclude farmers who do not serve as leaders or senior activists within 
farmer movements – a classification which generally encompasses smallholders or those 
working solely in agriculture – is rooted in risks pertaining to their vulnerability to severe 
mental distress either during or post-interview. The study cannot be separated from the fact 
that most participants belong to a population where suicides are known to be prevalent. 
Considering the vulnerable nature of farming communities, in conjunction with the sensitive 
(and in some capacity, upsetting) nature of the questions asked, the likelihood of an individual 
harming her/himself certainly increases. This is especially noteworthy considering that I am 
not a trained clinician and do not have professional experiences dealing with mental health 
issues. 
Considering that the research conducted for this study did place limits on the 
participation of farmers, there is certainly scope for expanded research in the area of present-
day farmer movements in India, specifically research grounded in the lived experiences of 
farmers themselves. 
The second limitation of this study pertains to the fact that there are a limited number 
of female participants who are leaders of non-profits (including farmer unions). This is 
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primarily due to the fact that within rural settings in India, it is far more common to find a 
male-led movement, be it social or political.  
Furthermore, approximately half the interviews required an interpreter. In a few cases, 
this hindered the researcher’s ability to personally connect with individuals which 
automatically impacted the depth of conversation. This appeared to be particularly relevant 
when participants chose to discuss more personal issues pertaining to economic struggle.  
Lastly, while multiple themes that emerged during this study can be easily applied to 
the broader landscape of farmer movements across India, the results should not be generalized. 
The scope of the study is limited to a single district within Maharashtra and it is vital to note 








Whether or not we acknowledge it, politics permeate almost every aspect of our lives. 
Political institutions regulate the volume of privilege our respective communities hold, and to 
a significant extent, they determine both the personal and professional trajectories we are likely 
to take as individuals. But we cannot talk about politics without talking about people, and we 
cannot analyze socio-political processes without factoring in human nature and tendency.  
To a large measure, both historical and present-day farmer movements in the Vidarbhan 
district of Wardha appear to be influenced by such human tendencies – specifically our 
propensity to derive a sense of purpose from feelings of inclusion and belonging. Hence, much 
like the broader cultural context of the Indian subcontinent, findings suggest that Wardha’s 
farmer movements pivot around two broad pillars of the human political experience: identity 
and community.  
Using these two pillars as a framework, Section 5 introduces the study’s findings on 
the landscape of historical and present-day farmer movements in Wardha. First, I examine the 
trajectory of Vidarbha’s movements of the 80s, including the events which led to both its 
emergence and eventual collapse. With this, I illustrate how these events have influenced the 
manner in which today’s movements operate. I then present a detailed characterization of 
present-day farmer movements in Wardha, focusing on their scope of operation, structure and 
leadership. Finally, I describe present-day dynamics within Wardha’s farming communities.  
5.1 The History of Peasant Mobilization in Vidarbha 
The weakening of India’s agricultural economy began prior to its independence in 1947 
(Posani 2009, 15). Yet, Maharashtra’s farmers only began organizing in the 1980s (Omvedt 
1989, 8-9). What were the conditions which sparked the movement’s emergence and why did 
their influence seemingly dissipate in the 90s? More significantly, do any remnants of its 
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success (or eventual failure) still linger in the region? Section 5.1 attempts to address these 
gaps in literature through the personal accounts of activists who participated in the movements 
of the 80s. The narratives of participants associated with Wardha’s present-day farmer 
movements are also employed.  
5.1.1 Emergence and Decline 
The Rise of Shetkari Sanghatana (1979-1990) 
Shetkari Sanghatana (SS) was a pan-Maharashtrian farmer’s movement founded in 
1979 by Indian economist Sharad Joshi. SS was the only organized farmer’s movement in 
Maharashtra at the time and their focus was initially on the state’s cotton farmers. As is the 
case today, Maharashtra’s cotton-production lay primarily within Vidarbha which then became 
their region of operation.  
SS began their advocacy around the state’s Cotton Monopoly Procurement Scheme 
(1972), a policy which allowed the State to dictate the monetary value of a farmer’s output. 
Since the annual price announced by the government was consistently lower than farmers’ 
costs of production, SS initially lobbied to demand remunerative prices for cotton farmers. In 
the initial stage of building support for his lobby, Joshi prioritized two aspects: (i) educating 
farmers about the policies affecting their income; and (ii) breaking down divisions in class, 
caste, religion and gender (Chatap 2017; Jawandhia 2017; Kashikar 2017).  
To this end, SS activists travelled to almost every village in Vidarbha’s cotton-
producing districts (Jawandhia 2017). This was key in mobilizing farmers since most were 
unfamiliar with the workings of agricultural policies and had for the most part accepted that an 
acutely low income was just ‘part of the job’ (Barhate 2017; Chatap 2017; Jawandhia 2017). 
Joshi also addressed cultural and economic divisions in his public addresses, stressing that 
regardless of how much land a farmer owned or ethnic background, the root of their economic 
struggles was ultimately the same (Chatap 2017; Jawandhia 2017).  
 27 
By the mid-1980s, support for the movement had begun to permeate urban spaces  and 
roads and railways were often blocked during demonstrations (Kashikar 2017). Farmers also 
banned politicians from making speeches in their villages unless they also agreed to take 
questions from its residents. In effect, politicians finally began addressing agricultural concerns 
(Barhate 2017; Jawandhia 2017). In 1982, Joshi founded an all-India farmer’s coalition. It’s 
membership spanned 14 states and its leadership was diverse in terms of language, crop type, 
gender, caste and religious background. By the late 1980s, both the thematic and geographical 
scope of SS advocacy encompassed multiple crops and regions within Maharashtra (Jawandhia 
2017; Kashikar 2017). 
How Did SS Lose its Influence? 
Until 1990, SS remained consistent in their demand for the government to implement 
protectional mechanisms for farmers. In 1991, Joshi changed his movement’s political position. 
He began advocating for farmers to be able to sell their produce on the free market, arguing 
that Indian agriculture could only progress without State intervention. This proved to be highly 
divisive amongst SS leadership, many of whom doubted Joshi’s new liberal economic model. 
While strategic decisions within SS were made through a Working Committee of leaders and 
farmer representatives, Joshi took this particular decision by himself (Jawandhia 2017).  
That same year, Monsanto was in the process of applying for a permit to distribute a 
genetically modified cotton variety called Bt cotton. Joshi was supportive of this development, 
citing the need for Indian farmers to embrace modern technology and globalization. This 
further isolated leaders who viewed Joshi’s new positions as being pro-industry. When select 
activists voiced their concerns to Joshi, they were dismissed (Jawandhia 2017). Conversely, 
some leaders supported Joshi’s new political positions (Chatap 2017; Kashikar 2017).  
As Joshi continued to exercise autonomy in his decision-making, leaders began 
distancing themselves from him and his ideologies. By the early 90s, some had started their 
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own movements, but still lobbied under the name of SS. Hence, SS was no longer a single 
organization, but one with factions across Maharashtra, each with its own leadership and 
agenda. This divide eventually trickled down to the community level as farmers began 
separating themselves between these new factions, with many leaving the movement altogether 
(Barhate 2017; Jawandhia 2017).  
By the early to mid-1990s, cultural divides had begun to resurface within communities, 
and as asserted by a former activist: “These differences started diluting after 1980 and I can 
say that it continued up to around 1990. We were successful in dissolving all these disputes. It 
just was not important. […] But after 1991 that started breaking as well” (Jawandhia 2017).      
In 1993, Joshi began distancing himself from SS and in 1996, he became involved in 
district-level politics, although in his interactions with farmers, he had emphasized that he 
would never run for political office. In 2004, he also won a seat in the Upper House of the 
Indian Parliament. However, he ran under the name of a far right political party, which he had 
repeatedly denounced in his years of campaigning. Ultimately, Joshi’s shifting political and 
ideological positions compromised both his credibility and perceived motives amongst leaders 
and farmers, thereby hindering his ability to unite them (Barhate 2017; Jawandhia 2017). 
5.1.2 Long-term repercussions 
Joshi’s shifting stances and breach of trust compromised his ability to bring people 
together for a common cause. But how has this influenced the dynamics of today’s movements? 
Two primary themes of interest emerged from participant interviews. 
First, SS continues to exist as multiple factions across Maharashtra, each with its own 
leadership and agenda. Collaboration between factions is minimal (Barhate 2017; Gupta 2017; 
Jawandhia 2017). Second, Joshi’s shifting stances left farmers disempowered and engendered 
a lingering sense of betrayal, one which persists today (Barhate 2017; Jawandhia 2017; Kakade 
2017). Srikanth Barhate, a former economist with the World Bank and an activist with a local 
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movement in Wardha comments: “When the protests fizzled out, it sent a shockwave inside 
the movement and Vidarbha once and for all lost its ability to organize. This came from 
different things […] ‘I will not run for elections’, then Joshi backtracked on it; ‘I will not 
support a right wing political ideology’, then he joined it. ‘I will take a particular position about 
a particular policy’, then he changes that position. And down the road he got an Upper House 
seat and that was a credibility crisis. […] The movement’s natural thrust was interrupted and 
then there was no movement. It became something symbolic. Sporadic. No sustained 
momentum. […] And it caused irreparable and lasting damage to people's ability to come 
together for a collective cause.”  
5.2 Present-day Farmer Movements in Wardha: Operation and Dynamics 
 By the mid-1990s, SS operated as multiple class and caste-based factions across 
Vidarbha. However, despite this splintering, SS was still the only farmer’s organization in the 
region. Today, while SS continues to operate in Wardha, other movements exist as well – albeit 
on a much smaller scale. While some of these smaller movements are formally registered, most 
operate informally across a select number of villages.  
Section 5.2 describes the dynamics and operations of two formally registered farmer 
organizations in Wardha: Shetkari Sanghatana (SS) and Kisan Adhikar Abhiyan (KAA), both 
of which work primarily with cotton farmers in the district. Findings are presented along three 
procedural strands: scope of operation, structure and composition and leadership.  
5.2.1 Scope of Operation 
The Vidarbhan faction of SS is the most prominent farmers union in Wardha and the 
only one whose scope of influence extends to the national level. The movement’s presence in 
Wardha has persisted since its formation in the 1980s and their primary demands continue to 
center around the need for remunerative prices, rural infrastructure (specifically electricity and 
irrigation) and the procurement of modern technology (Chatap 2017; Mute 2017). To this end, 
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SS activists lobby district officials, the state government and the national government (Chatap 
2017; Kashikar 2017). Given that SS operates across Vidarbha, their focus in Wardha is 
primarily on cotton farmers, but it is not their sole focus (Chatap 2017).  
KAA was founded by Wardha’s farmers and community leaders in 2006 and they 
operate solely within the district. Their demands are primarily targeted towards district officials 
although recently, they have made state-level advances. (Barhate 2017; Kakade 2017). The 
movement is more reactive in their operation and does not pursue a fixed or prioritized set of 
demands. Their campaigns have previously centered around large-scale issues like the 
inadequacy of irrigation facilities in the district, as well community-level barriers like corrupt 
cotton traders or the need for protection against wildlife in the area (Barhate 2017; Pawar 
2017). Within Wardha, KAA focuses on cotton and dairy farmers (Kakade 2017). Leaders from 
both SS and KAA assert that the two movements do not collaborate in any capacity. 
5.2.2 Organizational Structure and Composition 
While SS and KAA have different scopes of influence, in terms of structure, they both 
operate outside a framework of collectivism. Officially, Vidarbha’s SS faction is considered a 
single unit. However, informally, the Vidarbhan SS faction is further divided into splinters 
based on caste, class, crop type and political affiliation, with each operating independently 
(Gupta 2017; Hardikar 2017; Jawandhia 2017; Pandit 2017).  
KAA has also splintered into class and caste-based factions (Kakade 2017). However, 
KAA leaders assert that they are sometimes able to dilute caste-based difference within 
communities, but this progress is often undone during elections (Barhate 2017; Kakade 2017).  
Participants (specifically journalists and former activists) also emphasized that women 
and farmers from tribal communities are consistently excluded from both SS and KAA 
operations (Deshpande 2017; Gupta 2017; Hardikar 2017; Tayde 2017). Leaders from KAA 
acknowledged this gap, but cited that women were unable to participate due to cultural norms, 
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while tribal communities were simply excluded due to the isolated nature of their villages 
(Kakade 2017; Barhate 2017; Pawar 2017). Conversely, leaders from SS denied any sort of 
exclusion in terms of demographics (Chatap 2017; Kashikar 2017).  
5.2.3 Leadership  
Local Knowledge 
Most movement leaders in Wardha possess first-hand knowledge of local contexts, both 
cultural and political. Of the 17 movement leaders interviewed for this study, 14 came from 
agricultural households. During interviews, several of them brought up their background 
almost immediately, citing that they had a personal investment in the cause (Saheb 2017; 
Chatap 2017; Kakade 2017; Pawar 2017). 
However, of the 14 movement leaders with agricultural backgrounds, 10 of them were 
sizable landholders, came from “upper” caste communities and were significantly more 
educated. While one can speculate on how this impacts their ties to the community, qualitative 
interviews with participants did not reveal any direct or definitive consequences of this.  
Political Influence 
Several SS leaders serve (or have served) as officers, ministers or lawmakers at all of 
India’s political levels: local, regional and national (Hardikar 2017; Murugkar 2017; Pandit 
2017). Vidarbha’s SS faction is currently overseen by two individuals who both worked closely 
with Joshi and have served multiple terms in the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly. Hence, 
several SS splinters in Wardha – although divided – have a direct line of communication with 
state and national officials (Chatap 2017; Jawandhia 2017). While both leaders represent a 
party affiliated with right-wing, Hindu nationalist ideologies, there are other leaders-cum-
politicians within Vidarbha’s SS faction who represent a center-left party. 
Conversely, KAA was founded by Wardha’s farmers and community leaders. Some 
KAA activists stated that they have party affiliations within the district, but none at the state or 
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national level (Saheb 2017; Kakade 2017). They asserted that without high-level political 
representation, the movement’s political voice is severely diminished and its participants are 
often harassed by local authorities and politicians (Barhate 2017; Kakade 2017).  
Interactions with farmers 
Collective identity construction within a movement requires a network of actors who 
regularly communicate, influence each other and negotiate. Such a process necessitates 
effective communication channels, participatory dialogue and most significantly, “mutual 
social recognition” (Melucci 1995, 45). Findings indicate that within Wardha’s movements, 
these elements are undermined by a lack of awareness, trust and limited farmer participation.  
Multiple activists from KAA state that their primary challenge in organizing farmers is 
not caste politics, but rather a lack of education. They assert that most leaders serving as 
politicians do not invest in educating farmers about the source of their disenfranchisement, or 
their rights as a community (Saheb 2017; Kakade 2017; Pawar 2017).  While describing an 
incident wherein local authorities stopped a group of farmers from protesting, he stated: “Why 
are farmers scared? Because they don’t have an education about the processes or what their 
rights are. Had they been aware of their rights, the judicial potential of the entire matter […] 
they wouldn’t have left the movement. No education, no awareness.” (Kakade 2017). 
With regards to the movements’ decision making processes, most leaders stated that 
farmers are consulted either during meetings or in informal spaces (Chatap 2017; Kashikar 
2017; Pawar 2017). Conversely, journalists and select independent activists asserted that 
leaders generally exercise complete autonomy while making decisions pertaining to strategy, 
rhetoric or demands (Deshpande 2017; Hardikar 2017; Jawandhia 2017; Phate 2017). 
5.3 Dynamics Within Farming Communities 
 While participants spoke primarily about issues within the movements themselves, 
many also chose to speak to the dynamics within farming communities. While several themes 
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emerged, three issues in particular were brought up repeatedly: the degree of farmer 
investment, the incitement of cultural disputes and the impact of suicides in uniting farmers. 
 First, journalists and activists alluded to the growing disinvestment of farmers in 
agriculture (Barhate 2017; Gupta 2017; Hardikar 2017; Jawandhia 2017; Kakade 2017; Pohare 
2017; Tiwari 2017). Of the 14 leaders who were farmers as well, seven had invested in alternate 
sources of income – this was especially true for larger farmers. Additionally, all farmer 
participants expressed that they did not want their children to pursue farming as a career and 
many had spent their savings on sending their children to urban educational institutions 
(Chandurkar 2017; Kample 2017; Kakade 2017; Wake 2017). This finding was confirmed by 
non-farmer participants who work closely with the community as well. 
Second, while identity politics appear to be ingrained into the movements, tensions are 
often exacerbated during election periods. This holds true even in farming communities where 
group-based social hierarchies hold less significance (Jawandhia 2017; Barhate 2017; Phate 
2017). Participants also indicated that in some villages, ethnic divides are exacerbated by the 
government’s provision of benefits for certain members of the farming population, specifically 
smallholders (Chandurkar 2017; Gupta 2017; Kample 2017; Tiwari 2017).  
Third, participants cited that farmers tend to unite when there is a suicide in the village. 
However, this unity is neither sustained nor leveraged as evidenced by the fact that shortly after 
the death of a community member, farmers go back to attending to their own needs and their 
family’s needs. This view was expressed by journalists and leaders of research foundations in 





This study, informed by structuralist and social constructivist theoretical perspectives, 
explored the experiences of activists, politicians and journalists involved in Wardha’s farmer 
movements. While these accounts encouraged us to view the dynamics of movements as being 
intimately connected to local perceptions of identity and community, they also provided insight 
into the continuance of India’s agrarian distress. In line with Polletta & Jasper’s (2001, 296-
297) findings, which relate collectivism to a movement’s success, participant responses suggest 
that the lack of collective identity within Wardha’s farmer movements hinders their ability to 
affect large-scale structural change, thereby feeding into the country’s agricultural decline.  
This collective identity deficit within Wardha’s farmer movements appears to be both 
pronounced and consistent in nature. A holistic understanding of how this deficit aggravates 
the farmer suicide crisis in the region, however, calls for a more critical analysis of the political 
and cultural environment within which the movements operate. Specifically, by drawing on the 
insights of structuralists as well as constructivists, we need to examine both the macrostructural 
and micro-interactional processes which influence behavioral patterns and collective identity 
construction within Wardha’s farmer movements (Polletta & Jasper 2001, 299).  
In the following sections, I pursue this line of reasoning by applying social movement 
perspectives to this study’s findings and using India’s farmworker movements of the 1980s as 
a frame of reference. I begin by outlining broad-based political processes which have splintered 
previously shared identities and occupational interests amongst farmers. With this, I then 
explore how the identity-based splinters engendered by these processes manifest within the 
movements themselves. Finally, I consider the structural repercussions of the collective 
identity deficit within present-day movements, specifically within the context of the suicides. 
In doing so, the following three questions are answered:  
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1. How do broader political processes explain the lack of collective identity within 
present-day farmer movements in Wardha? (Section 5.1) 
2. How do these processes converge with community-level interactions, and does this 
impact the attainment of collective identity? (Section 5.2) 
3. What are the structural and political repercussions of the collective identity deficit 
within Wardha’s farmer movements? (Section 5.3) 
6.1 Significance of Political Processes in Collective Identity Formation 
Cultural constructivists sympathetic to political process theorists use collective identity 
to explain how structural inequality translates into subjective discontent (Taylor & Whittier 
1992, 104), thereby constricting the impact of mobilization. This interpretation of collectivism 
meshes with a key question posed in Section 2.1: Can structuralists and cultural constructivists 
absorb each other’s insights without completely rethinking their foundations?  
In the following sub-sections, I engage with this question by exploring the institutional 
contexts within which collective identities (or in this case, the lack of such) are fostered within 
Wardha’s farmer movements. In doing so, I aim to throw light on a key question posed by this 
study: How do broader political processes explain the lack of collective identity within farmer 
movements in Wardha?  
6.1.1 Marginalization of Agricultural Interests in National Policy Structural  
India has long been on a path of structural transformation. Prompted by a string of 
economic reforms introduced in the 1980s (Hnatkovskay & Lahiriy 2012, 2), the country now 
averages an annual GDP growth of approximately 8 percent, a sharp contrast to the 1960s and 
1970s wherein annual output growth was just above 3 percent (World Bank 2016). The benefits 
engendered by this growth, however, seem to have been absorbed primarily by urban 
populations. 
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Census data from 2011 indicated that approximately 75 percent of rural households live 
with a monthly income of less than ₹5000, compared to 10 percent of urban households that 
earn the same (Mukunthan 2015; Statista 2015). Rural populations also fall behind their urban 
counterparts in several indicators of progress, including literacy levels, infant mortality rates, 
birth registration and access to basic services (Mukunthan 2015). Recent policies like Modi’s 
demonetization campaign also disproportionally impacted rural economies as the dearth of 
rural banking infrastructure had left its population almost entirely cash dependent (Dhoot 2016; 
Kumar 2017; Shah 2017).  
With insufficient infrastructure and policies to complement large-scale economic 
advances, rural Indians do not seem oriented to leverage the platforms provided by a globalized 
world (Harrison 2004, 4; Kaliyamurthy 2015, 89-90). Within agriculture, farmers do not 
benefit from greater access to markets or technology without technical training or social safety 
nets (Harrison 2006, 3-4). In conjunction with increasing costs of production, poor government 
regulation and poor infrastructure (including limited access to banking facilities), farmers are 
subject to consistent debt – a common factor behind most of the reported suicides (Kaushal 
2015, 49; Posani 2009, 10).   
Participant responses suggest that the persistence of structural inequalities, in 
conjunction with high rates of suicides in the district (Chaudhary 2016; Torgalkar 2017), have 
translated to pronounced resentment and dissatisfaction within farming communities (Barhate 
2017; Phate 2017), evidenced in part by an activist-cum-farmer’s take on the urban-rural 
disparity: “The people living in the city want to fill their cupboards with money and we are just 
looking for bread” (Kample 2017). Responses also indicate that 50 percent of farmer 
participants have invested in alternate sources of income, and not one wanted their children to 
pursue farming as a career (Chandurkar 2017; Kample 2017; Kakade 2017; Wake 2017).  
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These accounts point to a fundamental shift in farmers’ aspirations. Agriculture is no 
longer an all-encompassing way of life – or identity – and as stated by a former activist, “the 
survival of agriculture as a culture” is in question. (Gupta 2017). Gupta (2005) adds credence 
to this, asserting that “the principal motivation of a peasant today is to stop being a peasant.” 
But how does this discontent impact collective identity within farmer movements? 
First, if farmers do not attach any pride, importance or ownership to their identity as a 
farmer, creating an environment for mobilization around collective struggles becomes difficult, 
i.e. the potential attached to collective identity is debatable when the core ‘identity’ in question 
is unwanted and evidently on the decline (Barhate 2017; Gupta 2017; Jawandhia 2017). 
Second, discontent and disinvestment in farming appear to have fundamentally altered the way 
in which farmers see both themselves and each other. As Posani (2009, 40) asserts, with a 
decreasing loyalty to both agriculture and ‘the village’, social relations amongst farmers have 
become increasingly individualized, essentially based on market principles and less on notions 
of mutual obligation or community – both of which are necessary when leveraging culture to 
instill collective will and unified action (Stillman & Johanson 2007, 62).  
India’s macro-economic changes have fostered a sense of disempowerment and 
individualism within Wardha’s farming communities, thereby constricting their scope for 
collective identity construction and subsequently, their ability to impact structural change. 
However, as stated by Melucci (1995, 47), social movements develop collective identity “in a 
circular relationship with systems of opportunities and constraints.”  
In this context, these ‘constraints’ relate to the State’s severe neglect of agricultural 
interests, evidenced in part by the pervasive rate of suicides in the district. Hence, while the 
State’s marginalization of farmers’ interests fuels the dearth of collective identity within 
movements, this collective identity also feeds back into their inability to affect State priorities. 
Situating this analysis between a structuralist focus on State-centric action and a constructivist 
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emphasis on collectivism, it appears that the movements’ struggle with collective identity and 
the region’s agricultural distress are two frames which operate in an interdependent and 
mutually re-enforceable manner.   
6.1.2 Ethnicization of Politics Within Rural Communities 
Electoral Politics 
With 67 percent of India’s population residing in rural areas (World Bank 2016) and an 
estimated 58 percent of rural Indians working in agriculture (Dubbudu 2015), engaging farmers 
is often key to succeeding in the realm of electoral politics. However, both political 
commentators (Posani 2009, 40-41) and participant responses (Barhate 2017; Charudatta 2017; 
Jawandhia 2017; Khakade 2017; Tiwari 2017) suggest that farmers’ occupational interests are 
often proxied by identity politics during elections, i.e. voting decisions of farmers are shaped 
largely by their identities as dictated by caste, class, religion, region and/or language. For 
instance, in Wardha, political leaders reportedly lobby specific groups on the basis of caste or 
sub-caste – distributing cash and alcohol as added incentives for securing their votes – with 
very little being said about agricultural policy or economic concerns (refer Section 5.3).  
Identity politics might be unavoidable, but that does not make them less dangerous. 
They result in farmers’ identities being shaped by divisive political affiliations (resulting 
largely from commonalities in caste, class, religion, region or language) as opposed to shared 
personal and professional struggles. Consequentially, in Wardha, farmers of conflicting castes 
and sub-castes appear to be “pit against each other” (Posani 2009, 42), with differing communal 
identities serving as the drivers of these disputes both within and outside the movements 
(Barhate 2017; Jawandhia 2017; Khakade 2017).  
Goodwin and Jasper (2004, viii) argue that culture can become agency itself and 
mitigate gaps in political opportunity when leveraged to induce a sense of collective identity 
amongst movement participants. The movements of the 80s certainly adhered to this strategy. 
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For instance, by initiating public meetings with both Hindu and Muslim slogans, leaders were 
able to continually stress the non-communal character of the movements (Lindber 1994, 114-
115). However, amongst Wardha’s farmers, the institutional and cultural contexts within which 
identities are forged both create and maintain ethnic splinters as cultural ideologies are co-
opted and exploited to divide farming communities and movements. 
In effect, rural politics and cultural authority converge and reinforce divisive narratives, 
thereby taking away from the movements’ potential for political agency. Consequentially, 
farmers’ bargaining power as an undivided group is weakened, lending further credence to 
Varshney’s (1998) assertion that the multiple social identities of farmers act as a self-limitation 
to their acquisition of political influence, thereby compromising their ability to affect large-
scale structural change or mitigate the region’s dire agricultural distress.  
Group-Specific Concessions 
Since the late 1980s, separate socio-political categories in India referred to as 
“Scheduled Castes (SC)”, “Scheduled Tribes (ST)” and “Other Backward Classes (OBC)” 
have encompassed “lower” castes and tribal groups (Constitution of India). In addition to being 
formally acknowledge as markedly vulnerable groups, they are also granted benefits and 
concessions when applying to an educational institution or a job. While these targeted measures 
are implemented with the aim of leveling the socio-economic playing field, they often engender 
resentment and perpetuate false narratives of identity within communities.  
For instance, as highlighted in Section 5.3, some farmer participants expressed feelings 
of antagonism toward smallholders and “lower” caste farmers who received subsidies and free 
tools from the state government, arguing that they too are in dire need of these benefits, yet are 
systematically excluded (Chandurkar 2017; Kample 2017; Tiwari 2017). According to Gupta 
(2017), similar resentments also arise amongst farmers when the criteria for bank loans or the 
admission of their children to an educational institution are more lenient for some groups based 
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on these socio-political categories. Hence, while class and caste-based reservations and policies 
are meant to facilitate a more substantive notion of equality amongst farmers, in reality, they 
often exacerbate pre-existing identity-based divides. 
On one hand, targeted agricultural welfare regimes acknowledge that not all farmers 
possess equal access to political and socio-economic opportunities. However, findings indicate 
that despite being grounded in an aspiration for substantive equality, India’s class and caste-
based concessions draw from superficial understandings of equity and structural reform (Haas 
Institute). They engender an environment that makes social differences and hierarchy seem 
both natural and permanent, while further entrenching social disparities and identity-based 
exclusion amongst farmers (a notably diverse and pervasively vulnerable community).  
By implying that some farmers are more deserving than others, these enforced divisions 
validate narratives of caste-based hierarchies and inequity, in effect promoting internal 
stigmatization and discrimination, and reinforcing uneven power relations. Consequentially, 
inequalities, exclusion and resentment via segmentation are reinforced, reducing the scope for 
shared empathy or collective action within farming communities and movements.  
6.2 The Weakening of the ‘Farmer’ Identity: How Does It Manifest Within Movements? 
The government’s disinvestment in farmers’ needs in tandem with rural identity politics 
holds deep-rooted implications for whether see themselves as being part of a larger collective, 
the amount of power they attach to that collective and the core identities they relate to. While 
these overarching processes are certainly relevant in explaining the movements’ inability to 
impact meaningful structural change, they are not sufficient. After all, constraints similar to 
those laid out in Section 6.1 existed in the 1980s as well and yet, notions of collective identity 
amongst farmers have proved to be drastically different. Why? 
The environment within which collective identity is fostered needs to be analyzed from 
both external and internal points of view (Melucci 1995, 48). This suggests we situate India’s 
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overarching political processes (i.e. macro-structural processes) within the frames provided by 
community engagement and mobilization (i.e. micro-interactional processes) (Polletta & Jasper 
2001, 299). Section 6.2 employs these perspectives to address a key question posed by this study: 
How do broad political processes converge with community-level interactions, and does this 
impact the attainment of collective identity? In doing so, it explores how national politics coincide 
with cultural hegemony to shape narratives, emotion and perceptions of agency amongst Wardha’s 
farmers, in effect shaping the dynamics of collective identity within their movements.  
Movement Leadership as a Determinant of Collective Identity 
An analysis of the movements of the 80s suggests that leadership played a pivotal role 
in both its advancement and collapse. While Joshi and his colleagues can be credited for 
initiating the lobby’s processes of collectivism, the movement also began fading at around the 
same time that its high-level leadership began assuming roles in Parliament (refer Section 5.1). 
Using the decline of the 1980s movement as a frame of reference, we can draw a viable 
explanation for why today’s movements fail to unite farmers or impact structural change. 
Jawandhia (2017) cites that as the movement became more politicized in the early 90s, 
SS lost its ability to dissolve disputes rooted in identity, an observation substantiated by Tilly’s 
assertion that the rise of identity politics within communities can often be attributed to the 
increased salience of the State in people’s lives (1998, 468-471). Looking at Wardha’s farmer 
movements today, it appears that a movement’s politicization is so fundamental to its operation 
that without party affiliations, its scope of influence is severely limited (refer Section 5.2.1).  
With most of Vidarbha’s movement leaders serving as ministers or lawmakers 
themselves, the line between civil society and the State is arguably blurred, especially 
considering that within Vidarbha’s SS factions, leaders do not all represent the same party 
(refer Section 5.2.3). Movements are often co-opted and used as tools to secure votes for a 
given leader, and consequentially, cultural divides are not just preserved, they become 
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profitable. With a convergence of the leaders’ social and political agendas, identity politics are 
pervasive within the movements and in effect, this appears to result in a lack of: (i) education 
and (ii) dialogic decision making (refer Section 5.2.3). But what are the implications of this in 
the context of collective identity via community engagement? 
First, a lack of education feeds into the agendas of politically motivated leaders. Most 
leaders serving as politicians generally do not try to educate farmers as there is an incentive in 
maintaining unawareness within farming communities: farmers remain unorganized, divisions 
are maintained and their political influence is preserved (Barhate 2017; Gupta 2017; Kakade 
2017). As stated by Hardikar, a journalist who has covered agrarian issues for 21 years, “If 
[leaders] educated the farmers, then they will be free. So why would they?”  
Second, although farmers may come together around ideologies that they are 
collectively “against” (being anti-urban/anti-state/anti-capitalist), bringing them together 
around an ideology that they are collectively “for” is more challenging (Barhate 2017; 
Jawandhia 2017). As a result, farmers have an abstract idea of what they want, but it is far from 
being well-defined. They know that they are angry at the State, but they are less aware of the 
conditions which would facilitate the effective representation of their interests or foster 
sustainable social reform – including but not limited to the significance of collective action. 
With the absence of education, this gap in understanding persists with a direct impact on the 
scope for collectivism. 
Third, a lack of dialogic decision making hinders the mobilization of emotion – a vital 
aspect of collective identity construction (refer Section 3.1.1). Findings suggest that 
participants are rarely consulted during decision making processes (refer Section 5.2.3) 
Alluding to a politician within SS, a journalist commented: “I don't see any consultation with 
the farmers, not at all. […] He fights elections. Basically, he is using [the movement’s] platform 
as a tool to get elected to Parliament.” (Hardikar 2017). The exclusion of farmer participations 
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from decision-making processes within the movements results in a lack of ownership or 
belonging, in effect, constraining the scope for collectivism. As summed up by Melucci (1995, 
48), “there must be at least a minimal degree of reciprocity in social recognition between the 
actors […] When this minimal basis for recognition is lacking there can only be pure 
repression, an emptiness of meaning nullifying the social field in which collective identity can 
be produced.” With leaders “profiting” off cultural divides, today’s farmer movements are 
rooted in the determent of collective identity. But how does the movements’ politicization 
hinder their ability to impact structural change or mitigate the suicide crisis?  
The State’s de-prioritization of farmers’ interests in conjunction with divisive rural 
policies speak to a narrowing of political will and opportunity. However, Goodwin & Jasper 
(2004, 20) distinguish between political opportunity and people’s perceptions of those 
opportunities. The movements of the 80s were successful in diluting identity divides and 
collectively addressing structural constraints, but they did not accomplish this because of 
extensive political opportunity (or affiliations). Rather, via education, dialogue and the 
cultivation of trust, they instilled a sense of ownership amongst farmers and changed their 
perceptions of what could be achieved.  
This investment in capacity and emotion – fundamental building blocks in collective 
identity construction (refer Section 3.1) – ultimately resulted in farmers’ occupational interests 
taking precedence over their cultural ideologies. Subsequently, this investment mitigated the 
lack of political opportunity and the movements became some of the most important non-
parliamentary political forces across India (Posani 2009, 9; Brass 1994, 3).  
Conversely, the lack education and dialogue within today’s farmer movements takes 
away from their potential for collectivism and subsequently, for strategic capacity. As a result, 
their ability to create political opportunity, collectively invest farmers in what might be 
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possible, impact sustainable structural change or mitigate the pervasiveness of suicides in the 
region appears to be severely compromised. 
6.3 Structural Repercussions of the Collective Identity Deficit Within Movements 
Sections 6.1 and 6.2 point to the mutual influence of “objective” conditions (i.e. 
overarching political processes) and “subjective” motives (i.e. divisive community 
interactions). In conjunction, these frames reinforce social hierarchies and resentment by 
fragmenting farmers’ identities, in effect reducing the scope for a shared experience of 
marginality or collective mobilization (Polletta & Jasper 2001, 294). But do these conditions 
feed into the structural constraints described in Section 2, and if so, how?  
First, when farmers fail to acknowledge and operate with a collective sense of identity, 
their political influence is severely diluted. Hence, decisions about which issues “matter” and 
which do not are dispatched to those in power and as a result, key structural constraints are 
often neglected within national policy decisions. For instance, there is yet to be a significant 
campaign which addresses the impact of deforestation on farmers, the influence of Monsanto, 
the insufficient amount of trainings available to farmers, or the oversight of mental health 
issues in providing aid (Gupta 2017). Instead, movement leaders looking to advance their 
political agendas (refer Section 5.2.3) present the crisis as merely a question of infrastructure 
and economic policy. 
Second, splinters both within and between movements result in the narrowing of 
movements’ political reach and capacity (Goodwin & Jasper 2004, 14). While structuralist and 
constructivist models attach different levels of importance to various facets of movements, they 
both agree on the power of networks and capacity building as tools to either create political 
opportunities (Polletta 2004; Goodwin & Jasper 2004) or utilize existing ones (McAdam 2004). 
However, due to communal and ethnic identities which splinter Wardha’s farmer movements, 
networking and capacity building are largely absent (refer Section 5.2.2). This results in 
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disjointed levels and areas of influence – evidenced in part by SS and KAA’s varying scopes 
of operation (refer Section 5.2.1) – a factor which undoubtedly influences the degree of 
structural change achieved. 
Third, the collective identity deficit within Wardha’s farmer movements results in a 
limited political voice ascribed to farmers. The overall impact of a group’s lobbying efforts is 
directly proportional to the empowerment of its members. Constructivist models, in particular, 
stress that participants’ identity and purpose needs to be repeatedly emphasized (and 
emotionally activated) to achieve political reform (Walsh 2005, 57). However, with culturally-
rooted splinters in class, caste, sub-caste and political affiliation, however, take away from 
Wardha’s farmers’ sense of ownership and empowerment, thereby diminishing the 
movements’ bargaining power and curtailing their ability to impact structural change. 
 The inability of Wardha’s movements to impact structural change has resulted in 
persistent patterns of agricultural decline. This is evidenced by several factors including (but 
not limited to) the decline of rural populations in farming (Sood 2013), the neglect of farmers’ 
interests in recent broad-based political decisions (refer Section 6.1.1), long-standing socio-
economic inequalities between urban and rural populations (refer Section 6.1.1), inadequate 
farming infrastructure and perhaps most significantly – the consistency of farmer suicides in 
Vidarbha, a region which has continued to be the epicenter of the suicide crisis (Chaudhary 
2016; Ravi 2017; Torgalkar 2017). 
What is interesting, however, is that these indicators of agricultural distress have 
remained fairly consistent since the mid-1990s (Posani 2009, 20-27). Hence, it appears that the 
collective identity deficit within Wardha’s movements does not create new problems. Rather, 
it helps maintain the very constraints (both structural and political) which engender this lack 
of “collective”, thereby contributing to the perpetuation of agricultural decline and 






Complex in its implications, collective identity speaks to the affective bonds one shares 
with a group, which then compel them to protest either with or on behalf of them. Collective 
identity is often cited to fill the gaps engendered by State-centric structuralist views of 
mobilization. However, this perspective replicates the very dichotomies that collectivism aims 
to challenge. Collective identity does not contest the significance of political structures. Rather, 
it maintains that cultural influences permeate and meld with these structures, in effect shaping 
all aspects and contexts of sustainable, collective mobilization. The implication is that objective 
processes cannot be separated from humanistic needs and tendencies.  
The greatest strength of Vidarbha’s farmer movement of the 1980s was that its strategy 
was anchored in the mutual influence of “objective” structural conditions and “subjective” 
motives. By emphasizing collective needs over individualistic demands and beliefs, a 
collective ‘farmer’ identity took precedence over individual class and caste-based identities 
and farmers began to collectively mobilize in response to the region’s persistent agricultural 
decline. Despite limited political will and opportunity, the movement’s capacity and the 
emotional investment of participants enabled them to impact significant structural change at 
all of India’s political levels. 
Findings suggest that Wardha’s present-day farmer movements also pivot around broad 
notions of identity and community. However, unlike the movements of the 1980s, today’s 
movements operate via class and caste-based fragments, and consequentially, a collective 
‘farmer’ identity is largely absent. But how has this collective identity deficit compromised 
farmers’ ability to impact sustainable and meaningful structural change or mitigate the region’s 
high rate of farmer suicides?  
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A holistic understanding of the relationship between collective identity and structural 
change (or the lack thereof) calls for an analysis which draws on political processes as well as 
culturally-rooted collectivism. In pursuing this line of reasoning, this study found that identity 
based divides within farming communities and movements are compounded by both large-
scale political forces (i.e. macrostructural processes) as well as divisive community interactions 
(i.e. micro-interactional processes).   
The asymmetric distribution of resources between rural and urban spaces in conjunction 
with divisive rural policies have fostered an increasing sense of defeatism and individualism 
within farming communities. While findings suggest that this environment has certainly 
reduced the movements’ scope for collectivism (and subsequently, their potential to achieve 
sustainable social reform) similar constraints also existed in the 1980s, and yet dynamics of 
collective identity construction were drastically different back then. Why? 
The constraints engendered by overarching political processes co-exist with micro-
interactional processes which define behavioral patterns within farming communities. Hence, 
it is not enough to simply analyze the political and cultural environment fostered by large-scale 
economic reform or national policy. Within the context of this study, there is also value in 
examining the interactions between actors in the movements. In doing so, we find that caste-
based divides perpetuated by broad political processes are leveraged at the community-level 
by leaders looking to promote a political agenda. In effect, the cultural divides engendered by 
overarching processes is not just maintained, but also encouraged by select actors within the 
movement, thereby constricting farmers’ ability to come together for a common cause. This is 
in stark contrast to the movement of the 80s, wherein culture was leveraged to induce a sense 
of collectivism and expand political agency. 
Divides perpetuated by rural politics and cultural hegemony have certainly destabilized 
the fundamental building blocks needed to construct collective identity, including emotional 
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investment, strategic capacity, motivated leadership and cultural traditions. However, 
collective identity is constructed in a circular relationship with systems of both constraints and 
opportunities. In this context, that means that the movements’ struggle with collective identity 
construction severely hinders their ability to come together for a common cause, thereby 
undermining the scope for meaningful structural change.  
In effect, agricultural distress persists within Wardha – and more broadly, Vidarbha – 
evidenced, in part by the persistence of farmer suicides in the region. Hence, while caste-based 
identity divides might be compounded by divisive cultural and political processes (at both the 
national and communal level), ultimately, identity-based divides amongst farmers feed back 
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